Envisioning Israeli-Palestinian Security

The feature article reconstructs the historical context of the current Israel-Palestine conflict and envisions a possible future based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (re-endorsed by the Arab League in 2007 and 2017).  While proposals for a ceasefire in the conflict with Hamas are now being discussed, these efforts will not lead to enduring peace without the kind of comprehensive agreement promoted in this article.  Listening to the debate between “pro-Israel” vs. “pro-Palestine” activists in the United States, one might incorrectly conclude that there is no basis for such a comprehensive settlement.  (I use quotation marks because these terms lend themselves to a zero-sum mentality that I reject).  By focusing on the Arab Peace Initiative, Sharon Dolev shows that an enduring, negotiated peace is possible.

In this response, I want to outline some geopolitical and political considerations relevant to the realization of Dolev’s vision of the future.  First, I want to note that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been enmeshed in a larger geopolitical context, historically in the US-Soviet Cold War and more recently in the US-Iran rivalry.  This geopolitical context, in turn, relates to the global war system itself, consisting of heavily armed national security states, permanent war economies, and arrangements of world order based on military hegemony.  The state of Israel was born during the dawn of the American hegemony, and we are currently in transition from the American hegemony to a multi-polar power structure that includes the G7 as well as the BRICS bloc led by China.

The history of the state of Israel unfolded in the shadow of US military power, including massive US arms transfers to Israel and support for a hawkish Israeli foreign policy.  When considering obstacles to the Arab Peace Initiative (API), this nexus between US and Israeli militarism is the elephant in the room.  As long as this nexus continues to dominate Israeli policy, I see little hope that the API can be realized.  From the side of the United States, these arrangements have two sources.  They are upheld, on the one hand, by a war lobby consisting of military bureaucracies, “defense” contractors, oil companies, AIPAC, and other special interests.  On the other hand, they have depended upon American dominance at the geopolitical level, which enabled the United States to shape events in the Middle East. 

As for the US war lobby, it continues to exert formidable influence on public policy.  On the geopolitical front, however, change is afoot.  While the Biden Administration doubled down on longstanding US policies such as NATO expansion and essentially unconditional military aid to Israel, the BRICS bloc has been promoting new arrangements, most notably China’s initiative to facilitate cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  If such channels could be used to mobilize Iranian support for the API, the success of the initiative would be one step closer.

Meanwhile, a Kamala Harris presidency in 2025 could be consequential.  It would hardly result in a complete break from Biden’s hawkish foreign policy, but could open some new possibilities for multilateral diplomacy, comparable to the Obama Administration’s role in the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA).  Dolev’s article comes at precisely the right time to inform a revised US Middle East policy, and should be circulated as widely as possible in Washington, including to Republicans.

I welcome Sharon Dolev’s reflections on the foregoing.  In addition, I would like to outline some political concerns I hear from my “pro-Israel” friends.  (What I mean by this ambiguous and problematic term will become apparent from the views I present below).  In this concluding section, I will articulate ideas that are not necessarily my own but which I have encountered from friends who in my view idealize the role of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  First, Sharon Dolev wrote: “The incremental nature of the Oslo process meant that each setback had a significant impact, and the failure to address core issues such as Jerusalem and refugees ultimately led to its collapse, leaving primarily security arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.”  While all this may be true, to what extent was Oslo’s collapse due to Yassir Arafat’s intransigence and the Second Intifada?

Second, the Arab Peace Initiative has been circulating for over 20 years, as the author herself acknowledges.  Perhaps it hasn’t worked because it is fatally flawed. It requires Israel’s withdrawal from all territories acquired since 1967, which includes the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Is this something Israelis could ever agree to?  Also, the API incorporates UN GA Resolution 194 (which in effect endorses a Palestinian right of return) and calls for “rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.”  Doesn’t this violate the principle of partition, whose rejection by the Palestinians ignited the conflict that still plagues us today? The Jews driven out of Arab countries never got a right of return. Israel absorbed them and made them citizens. The Arab countries did not do likewise with Palestinian refugees. Instead, they kept them in squalid refugee camps, without full privileges of citizenship.  Why should the entire onus of solving the Palestinian refugee problem fall on Israel? 

Another major concern of my pro-Israel friends is Iran, which they see as being on a religious mission to destroy Israel. Unless this is ameliorated, an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unlikely.  This is related to the issue of Islamic anti-Semitism, a problem that has gotten little recognition in the US media, even as criticism of Israel is voiced increasingly.  Religiously based anti-Semitism in Iran and Palestine continue to fuel conflict in the Middle East and if not addressed can undermine the API and similar initiatives.

I welcome Sharon Dolev’s responses to the geopolitical considerations I have presented above, as well as political concerns from the pro-Israel camp outlined here.  Of course, these topics cannot be addressed in any depth in this abbreviated format, but I look forward to hearing any of her thoughts on any of the above points that she feels can be profitably engaged.

[Acknowledgement: this essay benefitted immeasurably from conversations with Charles Gourgey, Ph.D., a clinician and independent scholar of the Abrahamic religions. https://www.judeochristianity.org]