

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER

by Brian D'Agostino, Ph.D. and Jon Rynn, Ph.D.*

Paul Kennedy's 1987 book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* puts into historical perspective the role of the United States in today's international system. Since 1500, Europe and the world have witnessed four systems of military hegemony, led successively by Spain, France, Britain, and now the United States. If this pattern continues, China could emerge as the fifth such hegemon. As Kennedy documents in rich detail, each country achieved hegemony on the basis of its wealth, only to squander that wealth on endless wars and imperial over-reach, setting the stage for the next hegemon.

But it is not inevitable that this cycle will continue. Kennedy wrote another book, *The Parliament of Man* (2006), about the possibilities for demilitarization and common security on our increasingly interdependent planet. As the world's current superpower and military hegemon, the United States sits at a crossroads between the militarized geopolitics of the past and a different kind of future that is possible, where resources are allocated to sustainable human flourishing instead of war. This more hopeful agenda is sometimes called "human security" because, unlike "national security," it is centered on the needs of people rather than of states.

Joe Biden and Kamala Harris were elected in 2020 on a promise to reform U.S. foreign policy. They committed themselves to disengaging from "endless wars" and to promoting a "rules-based" foreign policy. Since winning the White House, however, Biden and his team have not yet enacted policies commensurate with these promises. To be sure, the President did end America's longest war in August 2021, and took the political heat when the Taliban returned to power in Kabul. At the same time, however, the Biden Administration appears to be perpetuating and even expanding policies and expenditures that will continue the pursuit U.S. global military supremacy (Tepperman, 2021; Koshgarian, 2021), hardly the mark of a "rules-based" foreign policy.

To think clearly about international security, it is necessary to cut through the myriad and ever-changing rationalizations for militarism produced by well-funded think tanks. Is there a military solution to Ukraine, Palestine, or the security of Taiwan? Was there a military solution to Vietnam? We will show that most of what the US spends on its military is not only unnecessary for security, but provocative and counterproductive. This means that massive revenues can be redeployed to common global goods including stable climate, sustainable prosperity, biodiversity, cybersecurity, and effective responses to pandemics.

This paper explores the critical imperative to rethink the US national security paradigm. We need to end policies that benefit entrenched special interests at taxpayer expense while exacerbating confrontation, violence and suffering. We will show how the United States can greatly reduce its military spending without adversely affecting U.S. or international security, and illustrate what "rules-based" foreign policy can and should look like. We will also show how resources can be redeployed from swords to plowshares with minimal economic dislocation, helping to fund green investment on the scale needed to create a prosperous and sustainable future for all. This new paradigm, called "human security," prioritizes the rights and needs of

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people as the foundation for the security of states. (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2022)

Finally, a massive redeployment of resources from unnecessary military programs to urgently needed green investment is demanded by the global ecological crisis, which dwarfs conventional military threats to security by many orders of magnitude. Based on an unprecedented scale and quality of scientific research, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change underscores how hard it will be to mitigate catastrophic sea level rises and extreme weather events in the coming decades (Turrentine, 2021; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023). Yet failure is not an option if our planet is going to be habitable for future generations. The conception of human security that we advocate in this paper and our analyses and policy alternatives meet this test of relevance imposed by the global ecological crisis.

The U.S. Permanent War Economy

Armed force is not an end in itself. The troops and weapons that a country legitimately needs relate to the military threats it faces, not the size of its gross domestic product. If the US doubled its number of obsolete ships, tanks, and planes, the defense budget would soar, but the country's population and the world would not be any safer. Military spending is not a magic cure that somehow makes a country "strong." On the contrary, unnecessary military spending weakens the country by diverting resources from productive public and private investment on which future prosperity depends. It also fuels distrust, fear, arms races, strategic instability, and aggression.

In this paper, we will show how a rules-based foreign policy can simultaneously reduce military expenditures, strengthen the U.S. economy, and enhance international security. (By "rules-based," we mean a foreign policy governed by international law, not some amorphous substitute for the latter; see Beinart, 2021.) The first point that must be understood is that most US troop deployments and weapon systems are not directed at legitimate security missions. They are rationalized by flawed arguments that our allies want them and that they prevent inchoate threats from becoming real threats. But these ideas legitimize the real state of affairs—a permanent war economy and bloated national security state that upholds the power and profits of special interests in government and the private sector while burdening middle-class taxpayers.

In the last twenty years, the United States deployed tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Notwithstanding their staggering human and financial cost, these "overseas contingency operations" were counterproductive. U.S. intervention in Iraq created regional chaos, hatred of the United States, and an Islamist insurgency. The several trillion dollars in military expenditures in Afghanistan dwarfed expenditures for schools, roads, hospitals, sustainable agriculture, economic development, and the rule of law. It spawned hostility for the U.S. occupation and ultimately strengthened the Taliban, an authoritarian Pashtun regime posturing as defenders of Islam.

This whole nightmare is reminiscent of America's failed counterinsurgency war in Vietnam, which should have been a cautionary tale to defense policy makers when they sought to fashion a response to the September 11 attacks. But if it wasn't clear then, it should be now—large-scale military occupation of territory in the 21st century is counterproductive and eventually undermines whatever political objectives the occupying power might have had. The best way to

honor the thousands killed and maimed in these wars is to finally learn this lesson and make Afghanistan the last such war the United States ever fights.

If it is acknowledged that unwelcome “boots on the ground” and “projecting power” are disastrous policies, the consequences are straightforward and inescapable. Reducing the number and staffing of US military bases and deploying some of those resources to serving real human needs in regions of turmoil can benefit both the United States and the world, at much lower cost to American taxpayers (Vine et al, 2021). (As for the specter of resurgent Russian imperialism or an emerging Chinese hegemon, it should be noted that Russia has fewer than 20 military bases abroad and China has fewer than 10, while the US has over 700 overseas bases). Nor should taxpayers have to fund all the Cold War era weapon systems that have no plausible security rationale but continue to enrich special interests.

The scale of such profligacy is mind boggling. According to an authoritative study from Brown University’s Watson Institute, the cost of military adventures in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan since 9/11 is over eight trillion dollars (Watson Institute, 2022). Who has benefitted from these astronomical expenditures? Follow the money. If one had invested \$10,000 on September 18, 2001, spread evenly among Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, by August 2021, it would be worth over \$97,000, outperforming the S & P 500 by over 57% (Schwartz, 2021). Thus, our permanent war economy represents a massive transfer of wealth from middle class taxpayers to the owners of these corporations (D’Agostino, 2012).

The future, if change is not achieved, is even more shocking. An expected two trillion dollars for modernization of America’s nuclear arsenal will derogate legal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and stimulate a global nuclear arms race, diminishing US and international security dramatically. Beneficiaries include subcontractors, lobbyists, think tanks, and above all stockholders in the big defense contractors. The backgrounds of US Secretaries of Defense (James Mattis, General Dynamics; Mark Esper, Raytheon; and Lloyd Austin, Raytheon) highlight the stranglehold these interests currently exert over policy-making (2012b, 2021).

It takes time, of course, for innovation to transform anything as big and complex as the Pentagon. That said, the time lag for retiring outdated systems and deploying new and appropriate ones is exacerbated by the tendency of power holders to cling to power. In this case, high-level admirals, generals and civilian DOD leadership, whose power is measured by the number of people and amount of resources under their command, are fiercely resisting the kind of efficiencies and economies that are now possible. Also, while defense contractors are happy to supply the most advanced technologies, they do not want to lose contracts for all the obsolete, unnecessary and expensive weapons systems that account for such a large part of their profits. All of this perpetuates dysfunction and marginalizes policies that can actually work and realize core values of peace, justice, and security.

The above analysis brings us to the political crux of the problem regarding defense policy. The top Pentagon leadership and big defense contractors are well connected in Congress (Hartung, 2012a; 2012b; 2021), whose individual members have their own vested interest in defense manufacturing and bases located in their districts. At a time when productive public investment is needed to secure sustainable prosperity for all, this state of affairs can no longer be tolerated. Americans must now demand new fiscal priorities, which means a much leaner military and

redeployment of public resources to a national and international Green New Deal that can meet the needs of ordinary people today and in future generations.

A Demilitarized, Rules-Based Foreign Policy

Utilizing advances in technology and military science without regard to profits and special interests would enable the United States to downsize its national security state to a fraction of its current size without in any way diminishing current military capabilities (Quincy Institute, 2022; Center for Defense Information, 2022). An important proviso is that technical innovation must be done in a manner that does not provoke arms races, such as the one resulting from current modernization of the nuclear arsenal.

More fundamentally, defense capabilities are not ends in themselves. War is the continuation of politics by other means, as Carl von Clausewitz famously put it. In order to achieve its legitimate ends—U.S. and international security—military power must be subordinated to a foreign policy that addresses the political sources of security threats. Unfortunately, U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II has put the cart before the horse, pursuing military supremacy as an all-purpose solution to myriad problems that are fundamentally political.

In the year 2000, this quest for military supremacy found expression in the doctrine of “Full Spectrum Dominance,” according to which U.S. armed forces seek the capability to dominate military operations in all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace—everywhere on the planet (U.S. Department of Defense, 2000; Granoff and Eisendrath, 2005; United States Space Command, 1998). In this paper, we will not address the last of these domains except to say that cyber-security should be assigned to civilian law enforcement, not the armed forces. We will limit ourselves to explaining why the quest for military supremacy in the first four domains is not in the public interest.

What capabilities for waging armed conflict are really needed to ensure the safety of Americans and help uphold international security? Under Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, ratified treaties are the Supreme Law of the Land, and the United Nations Charter is such a treaty. Thus, the Charter’s prohibitions on the use of force outside approval of the Security Council, except for self-defense of one’s homeland, defines what a rules-based order requires of militaries everywhere (Burroughs et al, 2002; Grosswald, 2011). With all the attention that Americans are now devoting to preserving our/their Constitution, shouldn’t a constitutional foreign and defense policy be prominent on the country’s political agenda?

For the sake of argument, however, we will address four areas of US foreign policy that loom large under the conventional “national security” paradigm, which is preoccupied with military power projection. These four concerns are: the rise of China as a global power, the confrontation with Russia in Europe, Islamist and other insurgent movements, and nuclear weapons proliferation. Whatever else can be said about these complex security issues, U.S. efforts to act in all these arenas with the tools of military coercion are failing because in every case the underlying problems are political.

Regarding the rise of China as a global power, the United States stands at a crossroads between the paths of confrontation or collaboration. The first path leads to a futile, counterproductive, and expensive militarization of the Pacific Ocean and of space, including the daily risk of actual

confrontation, escalation, and possible war. This path is a lose-lose proposition for the citizens of both countries, who would bear the costs, but a win-win proposition for the U.S. and Chinese military establishments and defense sectors—who would amass greater power and profits at public expense. This path also leads to disaster for the rest of the globe because it ensures that the U.S. and China will be at loggerheads in the UN Security Council, which will undermine international security.

The path of collaboration, by contrast, leads to demilitarization and international security. Since the U.S. currently holds the upper hand militarily, it is in the stronger negotiating position and can afford to make concessions in pursuit of a collaborative long-term relationship. China's policy on the militarization of space indicates a willingness to collaborate but also a resolve to compete militarily if the United States refuses to collaborate (Moore, 2008). China has long championed the negotiation of a PAROS treaty (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) in the United Nations. But the U.S. has insisted on American military supremacy in space and has not supported such initiatives. In this context, China successfully tested an ASAT (antisatellite) weapon in 2007, indicating that if negotiation fails it will pursue military parity with the United States (Moore, 2008).

Thus, Full Spectrum Dominance is leading to a costly and unnecessary arms race with an emerging superpower, a race that the U.S. could actually lose but that at the very least would enrich the shareholders of defense contractors at the expense of the general public. The Trump administration's 2018 plan for a Space Force is only a recent example in a decades' long series of militarist escalations that indulge the machismo of American policy elites at the expense of U.S. taxpayers, unmet economic needs at home and abroad, and international security (Associated Press, 2018; D'Agostino, 2018). Another example is the Biden administration's 2021 deal to supply nuclear submarine technology to Australia, a windfall for the nuclear power industry with no public benefit and a possible increase in conflict with China (Jani-Friend, 2021; Mount and Jackson, 2021).

The time is long past for the United States to finally abandon this failed "national security" paradigm. Instead, American citizens should demand that our government join with China and Russia in the negotiation of a PAROS treaty and a range of other multilateral agreements in areas that include nuclear disarmament, public health, and a trade regime that can eradicate global poverty. Additionally, the US should be advancing both domestic and international efforts to support the transition from fossil fuels and nuclear power to solar, wind, geothermal and other green energy technologies, the only foundation for a safe and sustainable future.

Second, it is necessary to fundamentally rethink US-Russian relations. To be sure, Russia's annexations of Crimea, the Donbas, and other Ukrainian territory are most serious violations of international law. That said, the notion that these acts were "unprovoked" expressions of Russian imperialism is not consistent with the post-Cold War historical record. Putin's 2014 annexation of Crimea was certainly provoked by the US-supported, anti-Russian coup in Kiev that preceded it (Sakwa, 2015/2022; Cohen, 2019/2022). All of this occurred in the context of NATO expansion, culminating in the November 2021 US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, which not only called for Ukraine to join NATO but threatened Russian security by affirming an "unwavering commitment" to the reintegration of Crimea into Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, 2021; Caldwell, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2022).

In a forthcoming article, D’Agostino (2023) shows that the “Russian imperialism” narrative of the Ukraine war is not consistent with historical military spending data—a very rough proxy for military capability and threat—which shows Russia outspent by a factor of more than 20 to 1 for most of the period since 1992. Far from menacing the security of Europe in any objective sense, Russia has been hard pressed to uphold its own security in the face of NATO expansion (Mearsheimer, 2022; D’Agostino, 2023).

Full diplomatic resolution of the status of Crimea and other territory annexed by Russia may not be possible in the near future. But a long-term cessation of hostilities, such as the 1953 armistice that indefinitely suspended the Korean War, is certainly possible and should be the goal of US diplomacy. For the longer term, the US and NATO can negotiate from a position of strength for verifiable threat reduction agreements with Russia. Such a scenario is unlikely, however, as long as defense contractors and Pentagon bureaucrats continue to dictate US foreign policy, which predictably results in endless war.

Regarding the third of the above-mentioned security challenges—Islamist and other armed insurgencies—it is long overdue for the United States to learn the lessons of its failed wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as noted in the previous section. It is now obvious that large-scale troop deployments are ineffective and counterproductive. The case of Afghanistan is the most recent such failure and merits some comment.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, there was widespread support at home and abroad for a US intervention in Afghanistan, with the counter-terrorist mission of disrupting Al Qaeda and bringing its leader to justice for planning and ordering the attacks. The first part of this mission was accomplished in less than a year, after which the second part became a paramilitary operation that did not require a continued military occupation. In retrospect, many observers agree that the two-decade counter-insurgency war against the Taliban was both unnecessary and unsuccessful.

The very presence of U.S. and European troops in Afghanistan constituted an intolerable affront to Afghan sovereignty and fueled the Islamist insurgency, which eventually expelled the occupiers in August 2021. Ironically, this was precisely the outcome that Osama Bin Laden had intended with the 9/11 attacks—to ensnare the United States in a long war on the jihadists’ own turf that the latter would eventually win. Many proponents of Full Spectrum Dominance concede with hindsight that this particular counter-insurgency war was imprudent. But this is a familiar story to students of international relations since World War II, which is littered with U.S. foreign policy failures of precisely this sort (Bacevich, 2021; Chomsky, 2003). It is now long overdue to challenge the entire national security paradigm of which the Afghanistan occupation is only the latest example.

Going forward, the purpose of security policy must be redefined from upholding the power of states (“national security”) to upholding the rights and basic needs of populations (“human security”) (Granoff and Jacobs, 2021). This means enlisting regional stakeholders (e.g. Pakistan, Iran, and Russia in the case of Afghanistan) in defusing local conflicts and providing humanitarian relief. It means using cultural, political and economic influence (forms of “soft power”) as well as the United Nations to promote democracy and human rights, to whatever extent that can be done. Refraining from counterproductive military interventions would help avert the rise of future jihadist movements, which can also be achieved through economic aid

and diplomatic support for democratic regimes, costing a fraction of what the U.S. is currently spending on its bloated war machine.

Finally, as with the first three security issues, the United States faces a crossroads on nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—which is fully ratified by every nation except North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Israel—is a social contract in which the nuclear “have-nots” agreed in 1970 to forgo acquisition of nuclear weapons on the condition that the “haves” work in good faith for nuclear disarmament. The record of compliance of the “have-nots” over the history of this agreement has been nearly perfect. By contrast, the “haves”—the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain—are presently expanding or modernizing their arsenals, or both, in callous disregard for their disarmament duties (Deller et al, 2003). This present conduct renders irrelevant their argument that they have reduced the world’s arsenals from over 65,000 to around 13,000 today, a level that in any case still constitutes overkill of grotesque proportions.

The “have nots” (185 of the world’s governments) find this rogue behavior and nuclear double standard politically unacceptable. In this context, one of the original non-nuclear signatories (North Korea) withdrew from the NPT and developed nuclear weapons and another (Iran) apparently had a covert Bomb program before the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal. Non-compliance of the nuclear armed signatories has also necessitated the creation and entry into force in 2021 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022).

While failing to fulfill their duty to pursue abolition in good faith, the nuclear armed states (the P5 plus North Korea, Pakistan, India and Israel) are putting all of humanity in grave danger of the explosive use of nuclear weapons, whether by accident, design or madness (Granoff, 2009). Russia and the U.S. have 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. In 1995, the International Court of Justice unanimously directed the nuclear armed states to negotiate elimination; their disregard of this duty and of their own pledges in NPT review conferences is most seriously damaging to the rule of law (Granoff, 2015). The only explanation for it is undue influence of the war lobby and a distorted sense of national interest.

Under a demilitarized and rule-based foreign policy, by contrast, the United States would honor its obligations under the NPT and work with the other nuclear-armed signatories to establish a timetable for abolition. This would give the U.S. some semblance of moral authority when it talks about nuclear non-proliferation. Abolition is the best way to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons and would finally end the morally and legally indefensible practice nuclear deterrence, which risks the incalculable devastation of nuclear war (Weiss, 2011; Moxley, et al, 2011).

The necessity and feasibility of making clear progress towards nuclear abolition has been highlighted by the most hard-nosed actors in American politics, including William Perry, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger on the editorial page of *The Wall Street Journal* (Perry et al, 2021). Who are the dreamers? These steely abolitionists or those who believe that nuclear arsenals can be maintained indefinitely without weapons ever being obtained by terrorists or detonated in any of a myriad scenarios?

Few could have imagined in 1915 that centuries of armed conflict among European countries would be permanently over in a mere 30 years, yet the carnage of World War Two made that

wildly improbable, virtuous outcome a hard, cold necessity. Anyone who wants to be a realist today must look into the abyss of possible nuclear war and commit to a multilateral and verifiable process of abolition. Nor can we tolerate the continued diversion of resources from green investment needed to save civilization and Earth's biodiversity into war preparations of any kind (Benedict et al, 2016; Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict, 2008). The time for a demilitarized, rules-based foreign policy that can uphold human security is long overdue.

Beating Missiles Into Wind Turbines

Given the need to demilitarize the US economy and foreign policy, it is an important question how to effect a rapid transition of financial, human and physical resources from unnecessary military programs to alternative uses while minimizing social and economic dislocation. There are three policy strategies for accomplishing this—economic conversion of the private sector defense economy, attrition, and redeployment of personnel within the public sector (D'Agostino, 2012).

Economic conversion involves workplace- and community-based planning of alternative civilian production for private sector manufacturing facilities, work forces, and communities currently dependent on defense contracts (Feldman, 1998; Feldman, 2006). Attrition involves a Pentagon hiring freeze that would bring about a natural downsizing of the workforce over time while providing for the job security of existing public employees. Waivers from the freeze would only be permitted in the few cases where specialized expertise is required for which existing personnel cannot be retrained.

Redeployment involves retraining public employees displaced by the phasing out of unnecessary military programs and putting them to work elsewhere in the defense sector or other federal, state or local government agencies. Examples of redeployment are as follows. Veterans returning to the civilian economy can be retrained and put to work building and maintaining public infrastructure. Many of these troops have transferable skills as operators of vehicles and other machinery, electricians, mechanics, and so on. Accountants, secretaries and other support staff can be redeployed in the same occupations elsewhere in the public sector.

All the human and physical resources currently being squandered on unnecessary military programs can be reclaimed for productive public and private investment under a Green New Deal. Former weapons engineers can be put to work building the sustainable energy technology of the future. Steel being used for tanks and concrete used for military bases can be used instead to rebuild the country's crumbling water works and other infrastructure. The hundreds of billions of dollars previously spent on missiles, aircraft carriers and warships can now be spent providing adequate facilities for underfunded public schools; planting trees to reforest areas devastated by wildfires; and constructing the wind turbines, solar equipment and other sustainable energy infrastructure that can enable the country to reduce carbon emissions, avert catastrophic climate change, and lay economic foundations for sustainable prosperity for generations to come (Rynn, 2010). If ever there was a time to beat swords into plowshares, now is that time.

The U.S. private sector is not currently creating productive livelihoods at living wages for all Americans. One reason is that defense industries are depleting our productive manufacturing economy of engineers, steel, energy, and the other factors of production (Melman, 1983). By

contrast, a Green New Deal can create more jobs than the war economy, and by rebuilding U.S. manufacturing, can create sustainable prosperity (Peltier, 2017). Appendix I, reprinted from Heidi Peltier's 2017 article "Job Opportunity Cost of War," compares the employment multipliers for defense spending with those for typical Green New Deal categories of spending.

Appendix II gives a breakdown of how two trillion dollars per year could be spent on productive and sustainable public investment for a Green New Deal, as described by Jon Rynn (2019). Based on Heidi Peltier's total employment multipliers and Rynn's estimates of manufacturing intensity for each category of spending, such a Green New Deal would create roughly 21 million new jobs, including more than 5 million manufacturing jobs.

This new economy would re-employ human and physical resources currently being squandered on the war and fossil fuel economies, as well as provide full time, productive employment at living wages for all underemployed and unemployed Americans. Because it would create new wealth in an ecologically sustainable manner, the Green New Deal can be mostly funded by an increase in the money supply without creating inflation, and would not incur government debt if undertaken in conjunction with fundamental reform of the monetary system (Huber, 2017).

One feature of this bold program of public investment—it's global component—merits further comment in the context of U.S. foreign policy. This "Global Green New Deal" could take the form of industrialized countries' transferring clean manufacturing machinery to industrializing countries in exchange for the latter's maintenance of vital ecosystems on which the entire global economy depends. Our illustrative budget in Appendix II allocates 100 billion dollars per year as the US contribution to this initiative, which would be a win-win-win proposition.

First, it would create over a million high paid manufacturing jobs in the United States. Second, it would contribute to the eradication of poverty in the recipient countries by increasing their green manufacturing capacity. Third, it would compensate the recipient countries—say Brazil with its Amazon basin—for the maintenance of rain forests and other vital ecosystems needed to overcome global warming and maintain biodiversity. These and other visionary Green New Deal initiatives, which would help create human security, can become reality if a public interest movement demands them and forces the hands of Beltway elites.

This brings us to the ultimate irony regarding advantages of a peace economy over a war economy. A more robust civilian manufacturing sector will provide better insurance against future military threats than a continued war economy (Rynn, 2010). By depleting the country's industrial base, the war economy actually makes America less capable of mobilizing to meet future threats, like a spendthrift depleting his bank account and left unprepared for a future emergency. By contrast, public investment in green manufacturing is like putting money in the bank. It will be available if really needed, and in the meantime will even earn interest. We can always turn our plowshares back into swords if we ever need to, but until then they can produce sustainable prosperity.

What is standing in the way of such a common sense and urgently needed reallocation of public resources? The answer is an "iron triangle" of big defense contractors, Pentagon elites, and a corrupt and dysfunctional political system. Militarists continue to invoke the hoary Roman mantra, "Si vis pacem, para bellum" (If you want peace, prepare for war). In our planetary civilization today, genuine realism requires a new paradigm. This entails mobilizing science and technology in harmony with nature, respecting human rights and the dignity of all, and adhering

to democracy and the rule of law. On this basis, we can de-escalate violent conflicts and redeploy resources to make sustainable prosperity accessible to current and future generations.

Brian D'Agostino, Ph.D. is Editor of Disarmament Times and President of the International Psychohistorical Association. He is the author of peer-reviewed publications on the psychology of militarism, of numerous articles on public affairs, and of The Middle Class Fights Back: How Progressive Movements can Restore Democracy in America (Praeger, 2012). Dr. D'Agostino served as Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and has taught political science at the undergraduate and graduate levels at Adelphi, Hofstra, and City University of New York, as well as mathematical economics at the college level at High School for Math, Science and Engineering. He is a graduate of Columbia College and holds masters and doctoral degrees in Political Science from Columbia University. His publications have appeared in peer reviewed and popular journals including Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Political Science Quarterly, Political Psychology, The Journal of Psychohistory, Review of Political Economy, New York Daily News, and Z Magazine. His publications and curriculum vitae are available on his website at: <https://bdagostino.com/> Brian lives in New York City with his wife Constance L. Benson, a religion scholar, author, and educator.

Jon Rynn, Ph.D. is the author of Manufacturing Green Prosperity: The Power to Rebuild the American Middle Class (Praeger) and co-edited two volumes of Praeger's book series "New Trends and Ideas in American Politics." He was an associate of Columbia University professor Seymour Melman, a pioneering theorist of the US permanent war economy and demilitarization. Dr. Rynn's extensive writings on the Green New Deal have appeared in The American Prospect, Counterpunch, Foreign Policy in Focus, and numerous other print and online venues. He is the author of a chapter in Green Energy Economics, a volume co-edited by IPCC contributor and Distinguished Professor of Energy and Climate Policy John Byrne, and wrote the Ecosocialist Green New Deal Budget for Green Party 2020 Presidential candidate Howie Hawkins. Dr. Rynn holds a Ph.D. in international relations from City University of New York and taught political science at Baruch College. Visit his website at: <https://economicreconstruction.org/JonRynn>

APPENDIX I: JOBS PER MILLION DOLLARS OF SPENDING

from <https://www.peri.umass.edu/economists/heidi-peltier/item/995-job-opportunity-cost-of-war>

US 2015 data, IMPLAN, v. 3				% Above Defense Job Creation
	DIRECT	INDIRECT	TOTAL	
Federal defense spending	5.8	1.1	6.9	
Wind	4.8	3.6	8.4	+21.7%
Solar	6.4	3.1	9.5	+37.7%
Retrofits	6.0	4.6	10.6	+53.6%
Clean energy* *50% retrofits, 25% each solar and wind	5.8	4.0	9.8	+41.7%
Elementary and Secondary Education	16.6	2.6	19.2	+178.3%
Higher Education	8.3	2.9	11.2	+62.3%
Education (average of primary, secondary and higher education)	12.5	2.8	15.2	+120.3%
Infrastructure	6.1	3.7	9.8	+42.0%
Healthcare	11.5	2.8	14.3	+107.2%
<i>Note: Some totals have slight discrepancies due to rounding</i>				

APPENDIX II: GREEN NEW DEAL PLAN			
	from		
http://economicreconstruction.org/GreenNewDealPlan			
PROGRAM	TOTAL JOBS	MANUFACTURING JOBS	COST (billions \$)
Interstate Renewable Electric System			
Wind farms	1,260,000	340,200	150
Smart grid & storage	867,000	197,045	85
51% Utility buyouts			20
Building Energy Self-Reliance Program			
Geothermal heat pumps	510,000	127,500	50
Solar panels	950,000	228,000	100
Building Efficiency Program	1,224,000	299,200	120
Interstate High-Speed Rail System			
Passenger Rail	612,000	91,800	60
Freight Rail	408,000	102,000	40
Urban/Suburban/Rural Reconstruction Program			
Walkable Community Construction Program	2,550,000	573,750	250
Regional transit	1,020,000	255,000	100
Electric car subsidies	1,020,000	255,000	100
Bridges, roads, waterways, ports	1,029,000	205,800	105
Reconstruct water infrastructure	931,000	232,750	95
Civilian Conservation Corps	510,000	25,500	50
Federal Internet, Education & Health Expansion Program			
Interstate High-Speed Internet System	102,000	25,500	10
Build/rebuild school facilities	204,000	51,000	20
Childcare, Pre-K, Elementary and Secondary Ed,	2304000	0	120
Higher Education	280,000	5,600	25
Expanded Federal Healthcare	1,430,000	71,500	100
Zero Pollution, Recycling-based Production System			
Recycling	1,020,000	102,000	100
Regenerative agriculture	1,020,000	159,375	100
Green manufacturing conversion	1,020,000	1,020,000	100
Global green new deal (US contribution*)	1,020,000	1,020,000	100
<i>*export of industrial machinery</i>			
TOTAL	21,291,000	5,388,520	2,000

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